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I.   INTRODUCTION  
I . . . do solemnly swear . . . that I will support and defend the 
Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and 
domestic . . . and that I will well and faithfully discharge the du-
ties of the office on which I am about to enter.  
—Oath of Office1 
 Every officer in the United States Armed Forces must swear (or 
affirm) to uphold the oath of office, an oath to support and defend the 
Constitution of the United States against all enemies, both foreign 
and domestic.2 The oath of office serves as an important rite of pas-
sage into the U.S. military for two reasons. First, as a practical mat-
ter, the oath serves as one of the most important prerequisites to af-
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 1. 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2012).  
 2. Id.  
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firming an officer’s loyalty and allegiance to the duly constituted gov-
ernment of the United States of America. Second, the oath is ex-
traordinary because officers in the U.S. military swear allegiance to 
an ideanot, as many countries require, to an individual political 
leader or military officer.3 That idea, the U.S. Constitution, informs 
officers that their allegiance is to a republic“a government devoted 
to advancing the common good, of which the common defense and the 
general welfare are inseparable parts.”4 This is a particularly crucial 
point because world history has shown time and again that the loyal-
ty of the military to the government it serves is vital to the mainte-
nance of a free society.5 
 For all of its merits, however, the oath of office also brings with it a 
host of its own unique legal and professional issues.6  Throughout 
American history, the military officers’ oath to support and defend the 
Constitution has been tested by the secession of southern states,7 the 
political and strategic overreach of senior generals,8 and the assign-
ment of U.S. forces to international military commands.9 In the recent 
case of Smith v. Obama, however, the consequences of the oath are be-
ing tested in a new context and by a new question: can junior military 
officers leverage their own oath of office to sue their own Commander-
in-Chief to determine the constitutionality of their orders? 
 In Smith v. Obama, one junior military officer has done just that, 
arguing that the President’s order for him to deploy in support of Op-
eration Inherent Resolve violates his oath to support and defend the 
Constitution.10 Captain Nathan Michael Smith (Captain Smith), an 
officer in the U.S. Army, filed a lawsuit seeking declaratory relief 
against his own constitutionally designated Commander-in-Chief.11 
Regardless of the court’s ultimate legal decision, however, Captain 
Smith’s lawsuit prompts the discussion of a separate normative ques-
tion: should junior military officers sue the President to determine 
the constitutionality of the orders they have received? 
                                                                                                                       
 3. R. Davis Younts, Orders and the Oath: Understanding a Military Officer’s Duty to 
Support and Defend the Constitution, 39 REPORTER, no. 2, 2012, at 43.  
 4. ROBERT E. ATKINSON, JR., THE LIMITS OF MILITARY OFFICERS’ DUTY TO OBEY 
CIVILIAN ORDERS: A NEO-CLASSICAL PERSPECTIVE 46 (2015).  
 5. Younts, supra note 3, at 44.  
 6. See generally Thomas H. Reese, An Officer’s Oath, 25 MIL. L. REV. 1, 11-38 (1964) 
(discussing various historical events and circumstances giving rise to legal and professional 
issues under the oath of office).  
 7. E.g., id. at 22-28.  
 8. E.g., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., THE ARMED FORCES OFFICER 37 (2007) (1950). 
 9. E.g., Reese, supra note 6, at 33-38.  
 10. 217 F. Supp. 3d 283 (D.D.C. 2016). 
 11. Id. at 288.  
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 This Note evaluates Captain Smith’s decision to sue the President 
as a professional matter by utilizing a functionalist professional 
model rooted in neoclassical republican theory. Part II of this Note 
describes the legal and factual setting of Captain Smith’s lawsuit. 
Part III goes on to outline the functionalist professional model as it 
applies to military officers. In Part IV, this Note applies the func-
tionalist professional model to analyze and critique Captain Smith’s 
decision to sue the President of the United States. In Part V, this 
Note seeks to draw lessons from Captain Smith’s suit to help deter-
mine how junior military officers that find themselves in similar cir-
cumstances might proceed a better way.  
II.   SMITH V. OBAMA: THE LEGAL AND FACTUAL SETTING 
A.   The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and Operation Inherent Resolve 
 The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is unique among terror 
organizations because its history can be traced all the way back to its 
very beginning.12 ISIS originally grew out of the al-Qaeda in Iraq 
(AQI) terror group, which was responsible for much of the resistance 
the United States encountered between 2003 and 2010 in Operation 
Iraqi Freedom.13 When a 2006 American airstrike killed AQI’s leader, 
Abu Muzab al-Zarqawi, his successor, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, formed 
the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and appointed Abu Omar al-Baghdadi 
as its leader.14 President George W. Bush’s troop surge in 2007, how-
ever, proved successful and significantly degraded ISI’s influence in 
Iraq.15 By 2011, ISI had suffered such significant losses that they had 
become virtually nonexistent on the battlefield.16 Nonetheless, the 
surge did not completely eradicate the terror group, and from 2011 to 
2013, ISI successfully reestablished its influence in Iraq.17 By 2013, 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the group’s current leader, had become so con-
fident in ISI’s growth that he changed the group’s name to ISIS in or-
der to “reflect[] its greater regional ambitions.”18 In January 2014, ISIS 
                                                                                                                       
 12. Samantha Arrington Sliney, Right to Act: United States Legal Basis Under the Law of 
Armed Conflict to Pursue the Islamic State in Syria, 6 U. MIAMI NAT’L SECURITY & ARMED 
CONFLICT L. REV. 1, 4 (2016). 
 13. Lee Ferran & Rym Momtaz, ISIS Trail of Terror, ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/ 
WN/fullpage/isi-trail-terror-isis-threat-us-25053190 [https://perma.cc/86DZ-H36T].  
 14. S.C. DHIMAN, ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS): RECONCILIATION, 
DEMOCRACY AND TERROR 126 (2015).  
 15. Cameron Glenn, Timeline: Rise and Spread of the Islamic State, WILSON CTR., 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-rise-and-spread-the-islamic-state [https:// 
perma.cc/YZ63-74S2].  
 16. Ferran & Momtaz, supra note 13.  
 17. Id.  
 18. Id.  
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realized those greater ambitions when it conquered the town of Raqqa, 
Syria, and declared it the capital of its newly established caliphate.19 
 ISIS truly commanded the world’s attention, however, when it 
launched a dramatic military offensive in the summer of 2014 that re-
sulted in the capture of two additional cities in Iraq: Mosul, Iraq’s sec-
ond largest city, and Tikrit, the hometown of Saddam Hussein.20 ISIS’s 
offensive continued throughout the year when the group seized gas 
fields, border crossings, and dams throughout Iraq and Syria.21 By Au-
gust 2014, ISIS had further conquered the Kurdish towns of Sinjar 
and Zumar, forcing thousands more civilians to flee their homes.22  
 Prompted by ISIS’s threat and the resultant humanitarian crisis, 
President Obama authorized the U.S. military to provide humanitar-
ian aid to the threatened populace and to conduct targeted airstrikes 
against ISIS on August 7, 2014.23 Less than one week later, the Pres-
ident ordered 130 military advisors to Iraq to “assess the situation.”24  
 On September 10, 2014, President Obama formally outlined his 
strategy for Operation Inherent Resolve to the American public in a 
televised speech. The President promised “a systematic campaign of 
airstrikes against these terrorists,” with the strategic objective of 
“degrad[ing], and ultimately destroy[ing], [the Islamic State].”25 The 
President went on to note that his administration had “secured bi-
partisan support for this approach here at home,” and that he would 
“welcome congressional support for this effort in order to show the 
world that Americans are united in confronting this danger.”26  
 Rather than granting President Obama a specific Authorization 
for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), however, Congress opted to 
pass a continuing appropriations resolution for President Obama’s 
plan on September 18, 2014.27 Specifically, the appropriations resolu-
tion authorized the Department of Defense to “provide assistance, 
including training, equipment, supplies, and sustainment, to appro-
priately vetted elements of the Syrian opposition.”28 On September 
                                                                                                                       
 19. Id.  
 20. Glenn, supra note 15.  
 21. Id. 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id.  
 24. Micah Zenko, Your Official Mission Creep Timeline of the U.S. War in Syria, 
FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 19, 2015, 5:26 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/19/official-mission-
creep-timeline-us-war-in-syria-obama-administration/ [https://perma.cc/86V2-7UR7]. 
 25. Office of the Press Sec’y, White House, Statement by the President on ISIL, 
OBAMA WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES (Sept. 10, 2014, 9:01 PM), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/statement-president-isil-1 [https:// 
perma.cc/VXV2-Z5L2].  
 26. Id.  
 27. Zenko, supra note 24.  
 28. Act of Sept. 19, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-164, § 149(a), 128 Stat. 1874 (2014).  
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23, 2014, President Obama sent a letter to congressional leaders that 
provided details of his specific legal authority to carry out his plans 
against ISIS.29 The President stated that he was taking actions “pur-
suant to [his] constitutional and statutory authority as Commander 
in Chief,” his authority “as Chief Executive,” and his “constitutional 
and statutory authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United 
States.”30 By the end of 2014, the President authorized an additional 
2,800 troops to train and advise Iraqi security forces.31 
 In February 2015, President Obama sent another letter to Con-
gress requesting the passage of a new, official AUMF against ISIS for 
the first time.32 While the President acknowledged in his letter that 
“existing statutes provide [him] with the authority [he] need[s] to 
take these actions,” he was requesting the specific AUMF in the spir-
it of his commitment to work with Congress and against ISIS in a 
bipartisan manner.33 After numerous congressional hearings on the 
proposed legislation, however, Congress failed to pass a new AUMF 
in any form.34  
B.   The Legal Foundation for Operation Inherent Resolve 
1.   The War Powers Resolution  
 Any time the President introduces U.S. Armed Forces into hostili-
ties or situations where hostilities are imminent, he or she must 
abide by the provisions of the War Powers Resolution.35 Congress 
passed the War Powers Resolution in 1973 in response to what it 
viewed as executive overreach in ordering troop deployments 
throughout the Vietnam War.36 Congress stated its policy for the res-
olution as follows:  
                                                                                                                       
 29. Letter from President Barack Obama to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the 
Deployment of United States Armed Forces Personnel to Iraq and the Authorization of 
Military Operations in Syria (Sept. 23, 2014) [hereinafter President’s Letter to Congres-
sional Leaders], https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201400697/pdf/DCPD-201400697.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GDU2-M92U].  
 30. Id. 
 31. Zenko, supra note 24.  
 32. Letter from Barack Obama, President, United States, on Authorization for the 
Use of United States Armed Forces in Connection with the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant to the Congress of the United States (Feb. 11, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
the-press-office/2015/02/11/letter-president-authorization-use-united-states-armed-forces-
connection [https://perma.cc/7VUW-V84W]. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See Congressional Hearings on an ISIL AUMF, CTR. NAT’L SECURITY STUD., 
http://cnss.org/pages/congressional-hearings-on-an-isil-aumf.html [https://perma.cc/TXN2-RCX9]. 
 35. 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2012).  
 36. Id. §§ 1541-45; see also Richard Nixon, Veto of the War Powers Resolution, PUB. 
PAPERS 893 (Oct. 24, 1973) (“The only way in which the constitutional powers of a branch 
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 It is the purpose of this [joint resolution] to fulfill the intent of 
the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure 
that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the Presi-
dent will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces 
into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in 
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the con-
tinued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.37 
 The War Powers Resolution requires the President to consult with 
Congress before introducing U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities by 
submitting a written report to the Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate.38 The Presi-
dent must do so within forty-eight hours after “United States Armed 
Forces are introduced . . . into hostilities or into situations where 
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the cir-
cumstances.”39 The War Powers Resolution also requires the Presi-
dent obtain either a congressional declaration of war or a specific 
statutory authorization for the continued use of force within sixty 
days after submitting his initial report to Congress.40 Should Con-
gress fail to provide “specific authorization” for the use of force, the 
President must immediately withdraw U.S. forces from the conflict, 
unless the President finds that “unavoidable military necessity” ex-
ists.41 In that case, the President has an additional thirty days to 
withdraw U.S. forces.42  
2.   Congressional Authorizations for the Use of Military Force 
 When President Obama ordered military action in Iraq and Syria, 
he relied on two separate congressional AUMFs to legally justify 
combat operations. First, the President relied on an AUMF that Con-
gress passed in response to al-Qaeda’s high-profile terror attacks 
against the United States on September 11, 2001 (2001 AUMF).43 
Section 2(a) of the 2001 AUMF articulates Congress’s primary grant 
of authority:  
[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate 
force against those nations, organizations, or person he determines 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that oc-
curred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or per-
                                                                                                                       
of the Government can be altered is by amending the Constitution—and any attempt to 
make such alterations by legislation alone is clearly without force.”).  
 37. 50 U.S.C. § 1541(a). 
 38. Id. § 1543(a). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. § 1544(b). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id.  
 43. President’s Letter to Congressional Leaders, supra note 29.  
2017]  SMITH V. OBAMA 1509 
  
 
sons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism 
against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.44 
 Congress originally passed the 2001 AUMF to allow President 
George W. Bush to initiate the American war effort in Afghanistan, 
Operation Enduring Freedom.45 Clearly, the 2001 AUMF applied to 
the al-Qaeda terror group, which was directly responsible for the Sep-
tember 11th attacks, and the Taliban, al-Qaeda’s stewards in Afghani-
stan.46 However, the President’s use of this AUMF has drawn a num-
ber of critiques, namely that (a) the AUMF is now fifteen years old, 
and (b) not only is the connection between ISIS and al-Qaeda tenuous 
at best, but al-Qaeda has openly disavowed its association with ISIS.47 
 The second AUMF President Obama relied upon in pursuing Op-
eration Inherent Resolve was passed by Congress in 2002, during the 
run-up to Operation Iraqi Freedom (2002 AUMF). 48  This AUMF 
grants the President authority “to use the Armed Forces of the Unit-
ed States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order 
to . . . defend the national security of the United States against the 
continuing threat posed by Iraq.”49 While this authorization is nearly 
as old as the 2001 AUMF, it has been almost universally understood 
to include both the threat posed by the government of Saddam Hus-
sein and the national security threat posed by the instability in Iraq 
that followed Saddam Hussein’s ouster. 50  Nonetheless, the 2002 
AUMF remains an imperfect and politically awkward legal basis—
not only is it silent on the use of force in Syria, but the Obama Ad-
ministration even called for its repeal in 2014, prior to launching Op-
eration Inherent Resolve.51  
C.   Captain Smith Sues the President 
 Captain Nathan Michael Smith entered the U.S. Army as a Mili-
tary Intelligence Officer and took his own oath of office in 2010, be-
                                                                                                                       
 44. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001).  
 45. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War 
on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2109 (2005). 
 46. Id.  
 47. Olivia Gonzalez, Comment, The Pen and the Sword: Legal Justifications for the 
United States’ Engagement Against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 39 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 133, 163 (2015).  
 48. President’s Letter to Congressional Leaders, supra note 29. 
 49. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-243, § 3(a)(1), 116 Stat. 1498, 1501 (2002). 
 50. See Jack Goldsmith, The 2002 Iraq AUMF Almost Certainly Authorizes the President 
to Use Force Today in Iraq (and Might Authorize the Use of Force in Syria), LAWFARE (June 13, 
2014, 11:29 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2002-iraq-aumf-almost-certainly-authorizes-
president-use-force-today-iraq-and-might-authorize-use [https://perma.cc/6TVP-Q4W3].  
 51. William S. Castle, The Argument for a New and Flexible Authorization for the 
Use of Military Force, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 509, 525-26 (2015).  
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lieving that the U.S. military was “a force for good in the world.”52 
“With the people’s representatives in Congress holding the keys to 
war and peace, he believed that his service as an officer would carry 
out the will of his fellow Americans.”53 “One of his proudest military 
assignments,” Smith stated, “was in Afghanistan, where Congress 
had authorized the President to wage war.”54  
 When Captain Smith embarked on his second deployment in sup-
port of Operation Inherent Resolve he was ready, believing that the 
military operation was justified both legally and morally.55 While he 
“cheer[ed] every airstrike and every setback for ISIS,” he also saw “that 
people at home were torn about whether President Obama should be 
carrying out this war without proper authorization from Congress.”56 
Captain Smith began to wonder: “ ‘Is this the [Obama] Administration’s 
war, or is it America’s war?’ The Constitution tells us that Congress is 
supposed to answer that question, but Congress is AWOL.”57 
 Captain Smith started researching the legality of Operation In-
herent Resolve, beginning with the Supreme Court’s 1804 decision in 
Little v. Barreme.58 In that case, Chief Justice John Marshall held 
that “[a] commander of a ship of war of the United States, in obeying 
his instructions from the President of the United States, acts at his 
peril. If those instructions are not strictly warranted by law he is an-
swerable in damages to any person injured by their execution.”59 
Thinking that Operation Inherent Resolve may not be warranted by 
law, Captain Smith faced a conundrum: while he recognized that he 
was part of an important mission, he also knew that he had a duty to 
adhere to his oath to support and defend the Constitution.  
 Not long after his reading of Little v. Barreme, Captain Smith 
found an August 2015 Atlantic article written by Yale Law School 
Professor Bruce Ackerman.60 The op-ed argued that under existing 
case law, “individual soldiers can go to court if they are ordered into a 
combat zone to fight a war that they believe is unconstitutional.”61 
                                                                                                                       
 52. Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 4, Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283 
(D.D.C. 2016) (No. 16-843 (CKK)). 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. 
 55. Id.  
 56. Id. 
 57. Id.  
 58. Bruce Ackerman, Is America’s War on ISIS Illegal?, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/05/opinion/is-americas-war-on-isis-illegal.html?_r=0 [https:// 
perma.cc/FAS8-6BS5]. 
 59. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 170 (1804) (emphasis omitted).  
 60. Ackerman, supra note 58.  
 61. Bruce Ackerman, Can the Supreme Court Force Congress to Own the War on 
ISIS?, ATLANTIC (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/08/ 
supreme-court-and-isis/402155/ [https://perma.cc/ET93-UALB].  
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After consulting with Professor Ackerman, Captain Smith made his 
decision: since he could not be sure that his involvement in Operation 
Inherent Resolve actually violated his oath of office, he would contin-
ue to serve in Kuwait.62 At the same time, however, he would sue 
President Obama for a declaratory judgment defining the limits of 
his constitutional responsibilities.63  
 On May 4, 2016, Captain Smith filed his lawsuit against President 
Obama in the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia.64 His complaint alleged five counts against the President regard-
ing both the unconstitutionality and statutory illegality of Operation 
Inherent Resolve.65 Specifically, Captain Smith argued that Opera-
tion Inherent Resolve was being waged in violation of (1) the War 
Powers Resolution; (2) the Take Care Clause of the U.S. Constitution; 
(3) the 2001 AUMF; (4) the 2002 AUMF; and (5) the President’s con-
stitutional power as the “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy 
of the United States.”66  
 Regardless of the merits of Captain Smith’s legal arguments, how-
ever, a more important and foundational question remains to be an-
swered: as a junior member of the profession of arms, should Captain 
Smith have sued the President? In Part III, we turn to the neoclassi-
cal professional theory as the framework for an answer.  
III.   THE NEOCLASSICAL PROFESSIONAL THEORY: A FUNCTIONALIST 
APPROACH TO THE PROFESSION OF ARMS 
A.   The Functionalist Thesis and Neoclassical Professional Theory 
 The professional ideology of service goes beyond serving others’ 
choices. Rather, it claims devotion to a transcendent value which 
infuses its specialization with a larger and putatively higher goal 
which may reach beyond that of those they are supposed to serve. 
—Eliot Freidson67 
 Classic functionalist theory “rests on two closely related theses, 
the first about professions’ essential function, the second about their 
necessary form.”68 First, functionalist theory maintains that members 
of professions share a particularized and “socially essential kind of 
                                                                                                                       
 62. Ackerman, supra note 58. 
 63. Id.  
 64. Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 1-3, supra note 52. 
 65. Id. at 11-13.  
 66. Id.  
 67. ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC 122 (2001). 
 68. Rob Atkinson, The Foundations of Neo-Classical Professionalism in Law and 
Business, 10 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 429, 439 (2012). 
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knowledge and virtue.”69 Second, it argues that in order to maintain 
the kind of professional knowledge and virtue necessary to society, 
autonomous institutions are necessary for their control.70  
1.   The Function of Professions: Knowledge and Virtue 
 Different kinds of professions serve readily identifiable, yet dis-
tinct, social functions.71 What unites them, however, is that in each 
respective context professions “provide a kind of specialized 
knowledge and an associated virtue that society cannot secure from 
either the market . . . or the state.”72 With respect to the market, pro-
fessions provide a solution to two separate and well-known capital 
market issues.  
 First, there is a significant information asymmetry in the market 
between professionals and consumers of their services. 73  Services 
provided by professions are often so complex or difficult to under-
stand that ordinary consumers could not, without a significant cost to 
themselves, make fully informed decisions about the quality of the 
service that any particular profession provides.74 This is the role of 
professional knowledge—providing services that the public vitally 
needs. However, on the opposite side of the transaction, professional 
service providers are presented with the perverse incentive “to trade 
on their superior knowledge—and their consumers’ relative igno-
rance—to the consumers’ disadvantage.”75  
 Second, transactions between consumers and professionals 
threaten to impose external costs on parties outside of the individual 
professional-consumer transaction.76 Since these costs are not taken 
into account by the parties to the transaction themselves, they “tend 
to produce and consume the service in socially non-optimal amounts 
or kinds; the costs of their less than ideal decisions fall on others.”77 
With respect to professions like law and medicine, these kinds of 
costs are illustrated well by problems like under competence and ex-
                                                                                                                       
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 440.  
 72. Id.  
 73. Id. 
 74. Id.; see also FREIDSON, supra note 67, at 79 (“The requirement of discretionary 
specialization . . . and most particularly those based on esoteric, abstract theory, poses a 
serious problem to prospective labor consumers. How are they to judge whether a prospec-
tive worker is able to perform tasks adequately?”). 
 75. Atkinson, supra note 68, at 441.  
 76. Id.  
 77. Id.  
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cessive zeal.78 In the face of these problems, neoclassical (and func-
tionalist) theory provides a solution in the form of two requisite pro-
fessional virtues: first, that the professional place his client’s needs 
above his own; and second, that the professional place society’s needs 
above both his client’s and his own.79  
2.   Professional Institutions: Form Follows Function 
 Having identified the necessary function of classical professions in 
response to market failures, the next task is to identify their neces-
sary form. “The [usual] response to . . . market failure[] is govern-
mental intervention . . . .”80 In the context of professional services 
(like law and medicine), these measures often include special educa-
tional requirements, fiduciary duties, or third-party monitoring. 81 
Generally speaking, these measures are designed to “ensure that the 
unqualified do not deliver services and that the qualified deliver 
them as promised, at an appropriate level of quality, and without ex-
cessive cost to either clients or third parties.”82 
 Nonetheless, expounding crystal clear standards of professional 
conduct through governmental regulation is difficult.83 Not only do lay 
persons in government lack the ability to know whether professionals 
have the requisite knowledge but they also lack the ability to deter-
mine whether the professional is using his knowledge well.84 Com-
pounding the problem of the layperson’s inability to set forth clear 
standards for professionals is the additional problem that professional 
knowledge requires a significant amount of discretion.85 Hence, tradi-
tional professions claim that in order to secure professional virtue, 
                                                                                                                       
 78. See id. at 441-43 (describing under competence and excessive zeal as externalities 
in the legal profession); Rob Atkinson, Medicine and Law as Model Professions: The Heart 
of the Matter (And How We Have Missed It), 22 HEALTH MATRIX 345, 360-62 (2013) (dis-
cussing under competence and excessive zeal as externalities in the medical profession).  
 79. See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS 
125 (1998) (noting that the self-regulatory regime of the “Progressive-Functionalist project” 
enforced two basic norms, which “are primarily concerned with the adequacy of service to 
clients, and secondarily with fairness to third parties”); Harry T. Edwards, The Growing 
Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 66 
(1992) (“Good lawyers . . . must sometimes ignore their own self-interest, or the self-
interest of their clients.”). 
 80. Atkinson, supra note 68, at 445.  
 81. Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter’s Commentary on the Professionalism Crusade, 74 TEX. 
L. REV. 259, 272-73 (1995).  
 82. Atkinson, supra note 68, at 445.  
 83. See SIMON, supra note 79, at 123 (“Because such services depend on technical 
knowledge and resist standardization, they are not readily compatible with market or bu-
reaucratic organization.”).  
 84. Atkinson, supra note 68, at 446.  
 85. Id. 
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they must have a “significant measure of autonomy from state regula-
tion as well as protection from market competition.”86  
 Where neoclassical professional theory departs from the tradition-
al functionalist model, however, is in the functionalist idea that au-
tonomous professional institutions are needed to guarantee the kind 
of socially necessary professional knowledge and virtue.87 Instead, 
neoclassically republican professions rely “on more basic institutions 
of classical republicanism, education and deliberation . . . [and are] 
best situated in a neoclassical republic.” 88  In turn, that republic 
would be guided by professionals schooled as both philosophers and 
technocrats, where each of its citizens have the opportunity to be-
come the best possible professional, where “ ‘best’ means most knowl-
edgeable of the public good and most committed to, and successful in, 
its service.”89 
B.   The Neoclassical Profession of Arms  
You, the officers, the men and women of the Armed Forces of 
today, are the Nation’s Guardians, Guardians of today. 
—General John W. Vessey, Jr.90 
 Our Founders acknowledged in the Preamble to the Constitution 
the dual imperatives to “insure domestic [t]ranquility” and to “provide 
for the common defence.”91 By doing so, our fundamental law has thus 
recognized a precondition to civil society that has been known since at 
least the time of Plato: the need to watch over “enemies without and 
friends at home.”92 For the United States and Plato alike, the solution 
to this precondition is straightforward, at least on the surface: the es-
tablishment of a military that stands ready to provide security against 
the nation’s enemies, both foreign and domestic.93  
                                                                                                                       
 86. Id. at 445; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (1983) (AM. BAR 
ASS’N, amended 2016) (arguing that “[s]elf-regulation also helps maintain the legal profes-
sion’s independence from government domination,” which is important to the rule of law 
because “abuse of legal authority is more readily challenged by a profession whose mem-
bers are not dependent on government for the right to practice”).  
 87. Atkinson, supra note 68, at 487.  
 88. Id. at 490. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Gen. John W. Vessey, Jr., Remarks to the Combined 1984 Graduating Classes of 
the Naval War College: A Concept of Service (June 21, 1984).  
 91. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more 
perfect Union . . . provide for the common defence, [and] promote the general  
Welfare . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”).  
 92. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC bk. III, at 94 (A.D. Lindsay trans., Everyman’s Library ed. 
1992) (1906).  
 93. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-14; id. art. II, § 2. 
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1.   The Function of the Profession of Arms: Guardians of the Republic 
Officers take on immense responsibilities . . . unlike anything 
in civilian life, for they have in their control the means of death 
and destruction. The higher their rank, the greater the reach of 
their command, the larger their responsibilities. 
—Michael Walzer94 
 The function of the profession of arms in the United States is, first 
and foremost, “to win the nation’s battles and campaigns and to sus-
tain the peace.”95 Put another way, the profession of arms is funda-
mentally concerned with the fighting and prosecution of wars on be-
half of the will of the people.96 Implicit in the profession’s domain are 
two necessary competencies. First, the military “officer [must] hone 
his or her own [individual warfighting] skills to the sharpest edge.”97 
Standing alone, however, becoming a skilled warfighter as an indi-
vidual is not enough for members of the military profession. After all, 
the “military practice is group practice. The military art is deeply 
concerned with the performance of the human group under stress.”98 
Consequently, and most importantly, the military officer must also 
demonstrate a mastery of organizational leadership—of sharpening 
the collective unit’s skills and applying them in combat.99  
 The gravity of an officer’s competency as an organizational leader 
is immense.100 At the most senior levels, military officers shoulder the 
burden of articulating strategy and planning campaigns, often receiv-
ing orders directly from civilian officials themselves.101 At the more 
junior levels, the military officer is responsible for “the teaching skills 
to train subordinates, the executive skills to set performance stand-
ards and to evaluate their achievement, and the leadership skills to 
direct execution under combat conditions.”102  
 Finally, military officers are ethically responsible for applying their 
technical expertise according to the code of the Just War Tradition.103 
That tradition has two aspects—jus ad bellum, the morality underly-
                                                                                                                       
 94. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH 
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 316 (5th ed. 2015).  
 95. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 8, at 29.  
 96. Id. at 11. 
 97. Id. at 14.  
 98. Id.; see also HAROLD G. MOORE & JOSEPH L. GALLOWAY, WE WERE SOLDIERS  
ONCE . . . AND YOUNG 215 (1993) (describing the group practices of soldiers in the field). 
 99. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 8, at 14.  
 100. See id. at 12 (“Because [an officer’s] responsibilities include the potential whole-
sale taking and losing of life, the military profession stands alone, in its own eyes and in 
the eyes of those it serves.”).  
 101. WALZER, supra note 94, at 316-17.  
 102. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 8, at 24.  
 103. Id. at 14-15.  
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ing the rationale for going to war, and jus in bello, the morality of how 
a war is conducted.104 The profession of arms is concerned primarily 
with jus in bello, because they are the ones responsible for the conduct 
of war.105 Under the norms of jus in bello, the military officer assumes 
two crucial responsibilities: the responsibility to take positive steps to 
limit the infliction of civilian casualties and the responsibility to hold 
his or her subordinates to the Just War Tradition itself.106 
2.   The Institution of the Military Profession: A Model  
Neoclassical Profession 
 The profession of arms is unique among professions in the sense 
that it operates as a kind of monopsony facing a monopoly—in the 
“market” for the sanctioned use of armed force, there is but one buyer 
(the government) and one seller (the military). Consequently, the mil-
itary institution constitutes a de facto model neoclassical profession, 
necessarily situated within the American Republic. However, the 
simple establishment of a military institution is no panacea to the 
necessary preconditions of civil-society because it immediately poses 
a derivative problem: how should a society ensure the loyalty of  
the group that it provides a complete monopoly on the lawful use of  
violent force?107  
 The supposed “best” answer to this dilemma has plagued political 
societies since Plato’s own and continues to be a matter of debate to 
this day.108 For our Founders, the “best” answer lied within the gov-
ernment’s primary purpose itself.109 After all, our government “is a 
republic—a government devoted to advancing the common good.”110 
Under this definition, our Founders elected to “radically transform[] 
the role of the military in society” by subordinating it not to a partic-
                                                                                                                       
 104. See WALZER, supra note 91, at 21.  
 105. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 8, at 15.  
 106. WALZER, supra note 91, at 317.  
 107. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 26, at 140 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert A. Ferguson ed. 2006). 
 108. See, e.g., SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE: THE THEORY AND 
POLITICS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 84-85 (1957) (arguing that an objective control 
model of military professionalism is the most appropriate path to keeping the military 
subservient to the state without diminishing its capacity to defend the state against violent 
attacks); MORRIS JANOWITZ, THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER: A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL 
PORTRAIT (2d ed. 1971) (arguing that unless the military is supplemented with divergent 
liberal civilian values, the military will not only threaten civilian values but will suffer in 
its core defensive mission); PLATO, supra note 92, at bk. II, at 51-52 (“[W]ith such [spirited] 
natures as these, how are they to be prevented from behaving savagely towards one anoth-
er and the other citizens? . . . [W]e must have them gentle to their fellows and fierce to 
their enemies. If we can’t effect that, they will prevent the enemy from destroying the city 
by doing it first themselves. . . . Where shall we find a character at once gentle and high-
spirited?” (interlocutor’s responses omitted)).  
 109. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 8, at 1.  
 110. ATKINSON, supra note 4, at 46.  
2017]  SMITH V. OBAMA 1517 
  
 
ular individual but to the will of the people, as embodied by the Con-
stitution.111 Hence, the focal point of allegiance for all citizens, both 
military and civilian alike, was a body of “ ‘self-evident’ truths”—“life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”—that our government is de-
signed to protect.112  
 By taking the oath of office, then, military officers are sworn to 
support and defend the ideals embodied in our Constitution, both ex-
plicit and implicit. Explicitly, the Constitution delegates powers over 
the military to both the President and Congress.113 Implicitly, the 
Constitution subordinates the military to complete civilian control, 
“in recognition of the ultimate source of political sovereignty asserted 
in the Declaration of Independence.”114 Importantly, the military is 
an apolitical institution, duty-bound to obey lawful and moral orders 
of elected officials, and has no ability to act as a check or balance to 
any other branch of the government.115 
 Nonetheless, the military officer’s duty to obey comes with one 
important caveat. As both Plato and the American Founders recog-
nized, the common defense and the general welfare are inseparable 
parts of a proper republic.116 Thus, as a neoclassical profession, mem-
bers of the profession of arms are imbued with a duty even more cru-
cial than the general duty to obey: the duty of knowing and advanc-
ing the common good.117 This means that in the republic they serve, 
“the factors military officers are to consider in both making [the de-
termination to obey] and in deciding how to respond to it—the pro-
fessional, legal, and moral factors—must all ultimately be reducible 
to the common good, the common denominator of both civilian and 
military service.”118  
                                                                                                                       
 111. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 8, at 1.  
 112. Id. (quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776)).  
 113. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.  
 114. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 8, at 33.  
 115. Kenneth Keskel, The Oath of Office: A Historical Guide to Moral Leadership, 26 
AIR & SPACE POWER J. 47, 51-52 (2002). 
 116. ATKINSON, supra note 4, at 45.  
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. This is not to say that military officers have an inherent duty to act upon inde-
pendent assessments of the merits of political or strategic decisions made by elected civil-
ian officials. Rather, as a neoclassical profession, military officers must be knowledgeable 
of the public good and be committed to its service. Almost always, military officers act to 
advance the common good by obeying those authorities as they have been constitutionally 
designated. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 8, at 38 (“The American officer must refrain 
from individual interpretations of the Constitution. To be a ‘Defender of the Constitution 
and Servant of the Nation,’ officers must promptly and effectively obey the chain of com-
mand, regardless of political party or ideological bent. An officer’s duty must be to imple-
ment state policy and to execute without challenge the lawful orders of elected leadership, 
reserving advice for legitimate forums and restricting it to matters of professional compe-
tence.”); Younts, supra note 3, at 47 (“[T]he decision to defy an order is a serious one which 
may lead to court-martial.”). 
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IV.   CRITIQUE OF CAPTAIN SMITH’S DECISION TO SUE THE PRESIDENT: 
CAPTAIN SMITH’S LAWSUIT AS AN UNPROFESSIONAL ACT 
 With the factual and theoretical setting established, we can at 
long last address the ultimate question: Did Captain Smith get it 
right? Do junior military officers, by filing a lawsuit to determine the 
legal and constitutional validity of a war, promote the common good? 
This Part analyzes the merits of Captain Smith’s decision to sue the 
President and ultimately concludes that in this case, he did not.  
 Before we begin, however, we must note that Captain Smith’s de-
cision to sue the President is not a legally insubordinate act.119 In 
fact, Captain Smith never refused to obey any of the President’s or-
ders, and he has consequently received no legal punishment.120 Fur-
ther, Captain Smith’s decision to sue the President is unique in the 
sense that his motive for the lawsuit appears to have nothing to do 
with any particular ideological bent; rather, he seems to earnestly 
have questioned whether his participation in Operation Inherent Re-
solve violated his oath to support and defend the Constitution.121 
Nonetheless, as the following analysis provides, there is something 
deeply unsettling about a junior military officer taking it upon him-
self to sue his very own Commander-in-Chief.  
A.   Captain Smith’s Position in the Hierarchy of Military Command 
 All commanding officers and others in authority in the Army 
are required— 
(1) to show in themselves a good example of virtue, honor, patriot-
ism, and subordination.122  
 First, due to his deeply subordinate status as a junior military of-
ficer, Captain Smith’s actions impliedly question the judgment of 
many other officers in the profession of arms. Unlike a general of-
                                                                                                                       
 119. See 10 U.S.C. § 888 (2012) (“Any commissioned officer who uses contemptuous 
words against the President . . . shall be punished . . . .”); id. § 890 (“Any person subject to 
this chapter who . . . willfully disobeys a lawful command of his superior commissioned 
officer . . . shall be punished . . . .”); id. § 892 (“Any person subject to this chapter who—(1) 
violates or fails to obey any lawful general order or regulation; [or] (2) having knowledge of 
any other lawful order issued by a member of the armed forces, which it is his duty to obey, 
fails to obey the order . . . shall be punished . . . .”).  
 120. Matt Ford, Is the U.S. War Against ISIS Illegal?, ATLANTIC (May 5, 2016), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/is-the-us-war-against-isis-illegal/481377/ 
[https://perma.cc/SJ3C-3PS6] (noting that Captain Smith remained on active military ser-
vice while the lawsuit was pending).  
 121. See Steven Nelson, Soldier Suing Obama Over ISIS War Is Doing Fine,  
Lawyer Says, U.S. NEWS (May 6, 2016, 4:45 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/ 
articles/2016-05-06/soldier-suing-obama-over-isis-war-is-doing-fine-lawyer-says (“There’s 
no name-calling . . . He’s not saying the president is a this-and-a-that and that he’s not 
going to follow orders . . . He’s addressing the policy rather than the president.”). 
 122. 10 U.S.C. § 3583 (2012). 
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ficer, who may take his orders directly from the President or other 
civilian authorities, junior military officers, like Captain Smith, are 
situated under multiple levels of superior commands. Given his posi-
tion in the chain of command, then, Captain Smith’s allegation that 
his orders are unconstitutional begs the question: has every other 
officer above him with the same orders failed to ensure that they are 
acting in adherence with their own oaths? In a military that prides 
itself on avoiding blind obedience to orders, its members almost cer-
tainly have not.123 Vis-à-vis the chain of command, then, Captain 
Smith’s suit effectively questions the judgment of each of his many 
superiors, military and civilian alike. 
 Moreover, commanders and staff officers at every level are afford-
ed the legal counsel of the military’s own Judge Advocate General’s 
(JAG) Corps.124 Armed with this resource, junior military officers can 
rest assured that proper legal analysis of their orders is being con-
ducted not only at their own level of command but also at the many 
levels of authority placed above them. Hence, if a junior military of-
ficer questions the explicit legal basis of his or her orders, he or she 
has the necessary legal professional readily available to provide an 
answer. Consequently, Captain Smith’s decision to go outside the 
profession of arms to seek both legal counsel and a legal remedy not 
only questions the judgment of his own chain-of-command, but the 
judgment of his own JAG advisors as well.  
B.   Captain Smith’s Relevant Expertise: Officers’ Legal Knowledge 
 As we have seen, the profession of arms is concerned first and 
foremost with the nation’s ability to wage its wars, not its ability to 
zealously defend the nation’s constitutional doctrine. Consequently, 
Captain Smith’s foray into his own legal research and subsequent 
decision to sue the President took him out of the realm of his own 
professional expertise and into the realm of a wholly separate profes-
sional expertise—that of the law. Here, the threat that a lawsuit like 
Captain Smith’s poses to the common good may be more easily seen 
were the situation reversed: just as we presumably would not want 
our nation’s junior lawyers involved in the application of force on the 
battlefield, we also do not want junior military officers weighing in on 
complex constitutional matters in a court of law.  
                                                                                                                       
 123. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 8, at 34 (“[T]oday’s Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, 
Coastguardsmen, and Airmen, must understand not only what they must do, but why they 
must do it.”).  
 124. See, e.g., HEADQUARTERS, DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 1-04: LEGAL 
SUPPORT TO THE OPERATIONAL ARMY 1-1 (2013) (“The mission of the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral’s Corps . . . is to develop . . . one team of proactive professionals . . . who deliver princi-
pled counsel and mission-focused legal services to the Army and the Nation.”).  
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 Admittedly, Captain Smith’s legal basis for suing the President 
was rooted in the theory of a relatively well-known and widely cited 
Yale Law School professor, Bruce Ackerman. Regardless of the valid-
ity of Professor Ackerman’s theory, however, significant normative 
and practical problems remain. First, Captain Smith’s decision to 
adopt (and sue under) his own unique interpretation of the Constitu-
tion is exactly what the Department of Defense counsels military of-
ficers not to do.125 Second, the lawsuit improperly injects a degree of 
uncertainty into an area where certainty is of the utmost im-
portance—the legal validity of theatre-wide combat operations. Given 
these circumstances, the junior military officer’s legal judgment is 
best deferred to his superiors—the senior civilian, military, and legal 
officials making the ultimate decision to go to war in the first place.126  
C.   Federal Courts as the Wrong Forum for Junior Military  
Officer Dissent 
 Next, we turn to the issues posed by the fact that Captain Smith 
has elected to voice his dissent in a federal court. History and case 
law show that military officers have generally settled on choosing one 
of three options when faced with a potentially unlawful order: “they 
can (1) obey the order, (2) disobey the order and accept the conse-
quences or, if possible, (3) resign.”127 Notably absent from this menu 
is the option of suing the person issuing the order in a federal court, 
and for good reason: public dissent by military officers threatens to 
undermine the public’s trust and confidence in both the profession of 
arms itself and the politically elected leaders above them.128 
 Within the profession of arms, Captain Smith’s suit undermines 
the fundamental precepts necessary for an efficient and capable mili-
tary profession.129 As the Department of Defense counsels:  
                                                                                                                       
 125. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 8, at 38 (“The American officer must refrain 
from individual interpretations of the Constitution.”).  
 126. The military profession is by no means alone in recognizing the necessity of coher-
ent command and control between superiors and subordinates. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.2 cmt. 2 (1983) (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 2016) (“When lawyers in a 
supervisor-subordinate relationship encounter a matter involving professional judgment as 
to ethical duty, the supervisor may assume responsibility for making the judgment. Oth-
erwise a consistent course of action or position could not be taken. . . . [I]f the question is 
reasonably arguable, someone has to decide upon the course of action. That authority ordi-
narily reposes in the supervisor, and a subordinate may be guided accordingly.”).  
 127. Younts, supra note 3, at 48; see also U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 8, at 28 
(“[P]rofessionals are bound by their oath to execute legal civilian decisions as effectively as 
possible—even those with which they fundamentally disagree—or they must request relief 
from their duties, or leave the service entirely, either by resignation or retirement.”).  
 128. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 8, at 26. 
 129. Id. at 38.  
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An officer’s duty must be to implement state policy and to execute 
without challenge the lawful orders of elected leadership, reserving 
advice for legitimate forums and restricting it to matters of profes-
sional competence. Officers must not publicly question the effec-
tiveness or validity of national policy.130 
The federal courts, of course, are not generally accepted forums with-
in the profession for providing either advice or dissent.131 
 Outside the profession, Captain Smith’s allegation that the Presi-
dent is acting without legal authority in Iraq and Syria places the 
legitimacy of those orders at the front and center of political debate. 
Given the relative social prestige the military profession enjoys, offic-
ers’ “views are likely to gain substantial attention from a population 
that tends to respect military opinion,” whatever the level of com-
mand.132 Consequently, the action poses a number of significant risks, 
not only to the military’s social standing but also by undermining the 
nation’s confidence in their elected leaders on matters of policy and 
strategy.133 Of course, this is enough to give even senior military of-
ficers pause before voicing their dissent, let alone an officer far more 
their junior.  
D.   What’s (Possibly) Really Happening: Beware the Political Wolf  
in Sheep’s Clothing 
Let civilian voices argue the merits or demerits of our processes 
of government; whether our strength is being sapped by deficit fi-
nancing, indulged in too long, by federal paternalism grown too 
might, by power groups grown too arrogant, by politics grown too 
corrupt, by crime grown too rampant, by mortals grown too low, by 
taxes grown too high, by extremists grown too violent; whether our 
personal liberties are as thorough and complete as they should be. 
These great national problems are not for your professional partic-
ipation or military solution. 
—General of the Army Douglas MacArthur134 
 In Professor Ackerman’s initial Atlantic article, he argued that 
“individual soldiers can go to court if they are ordered into a combat 
zone to fight a war that they believe is unconstitutional.”135 Regard-
                                                                                                                       
 130. Id. 
 131. See Younts, supra note 3, at 48.  
 132. Risa A. Brooks, Militaries and Political Activity in Democracies, in AMERICAN 
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE IN A NEW ERA 213, 232 (Suzanne 
C. Nielsen & Don M. Snider eds., 2009).  
 133. Id. at 235.  
 134. Douglas MacArthur, General, U.S. Army, Sylvanus Thayer Award Acceptance Address 
at the U.S. Military Academy (May 12, 1962), http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/ 
douglasmacarthurthayeraward.html [https://perma.cc/2488-4KS5].  
 135. Ackerman, supra note 61.  
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less of whether a soldier legally can or cannot go to court, however, 
he has missed the mark on the more important question we are cur-
rently addressing: whether junior military officers should go to court 
if they believe the war they are ordered to fight is unconstitutional. 
At least in the context of Captain Smith’s lawsuit, to which Professor 
Ackerman serves as an advisor, the answer is no.  
 Most problematically for Captain Smith, the original impetus for 
Professor Ackerman’s theory was purely political. As a policy matter, 
Professor Ackerman initially argued that Congress was failing in its 
duty to provide legal authorization for Operation Inherent Resolve, 
and that in doing so it is setting a “terrible precedent” by allowing 
the operation to go on without proper congressional approval.136 One 
way to get Congress to act, he argued, would be to go to the courts.137 
However, having to rely on the courts posed a significant problem. 
After all, who could even get into court? If ordinary Americans, or 
even members of Congress themselves wanted to sue, they would cer-
tainly be denied constitutional standing.138 Not to be deterred, Pro-
fessor Ackerman ultimately found someone that arguably could get 
into court—the American military officer.139 In this context, Captain 
Smith’s lawsuit (at least for Professor Ackerman) pares down to noth-
ing more than a political stratagem, leveraging Captain Smith’s oath 
of office as a check on the executive branch—a proposition anathema 
to the apolitical values of the profession of arms.140  
 Of course, Captain Smith’s legal complaint refrains from making 
any such policy-type arguments. 141  However, the overarching ra-
tionale that Professor Ackerman publicly forwards as a justification 
for Captain Smith’s lawsuit should give junior military officers rea-
son for pause. At best, Captain Smith is honestly seeking a determi-
nation of the constitutional validity of his orders. At worst, he has 
fallen victim to a political wolf in sheep’s clothing. Whether his own 
intentions were pure or not, he appears to have been used as nothing 
more than a means to achieving one scholar’s political end. 
                                                                                                                       
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id.  
 139. Id. 
 140. See Ackerman, supra note 58 (arguing that Captain Smith’s lawsuit is necessary 
to allow individuals to prevent future Presidents from treating the War Powers Resolution 
with impunity); see also Younts, supra note 3, at 47 (“[T]he military is not only subject to 
the control of elected officials, it is without authority or imperative to act as a check or 
balance to the power of any branch of the government.”).  
 141. See Complaint for Declaratory Relief, supra note 49. 
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V.   WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED AND HOW WE CAN IMPROVE  
IN THE FUTURE  
Those soldiers who feel they cannot, in good conscience, fight a 
war—yet cannot leave military service—are admittedly faced with 
a difficult choice: fight the war they feel is wrong or be punished. 
This has the potential to result in punishment of otherwise honor-
able and loyal individuals. Allowing any alternative, however, 
would create the potential for a massive breakdown of military 
discipline and a serious crisis of national security.  
—Captain Robert E. Murdough142 
 The real value in conducting After Action Reviews “come[s] from 
taking the results and applying them to future training.”143 Part IV of 
this Note sought to identify and evaluate the professional issues 
raised by Captain Smith’s lawsuit. In this Part, we address how to 
utilize our evaluation to guide future conduct.  
 Under the neoclassical professional model, we have seen that mili-
tary officers bear the burden of not only prosecuting our nation’s 
wars, but of understanding and advancing the common good. With 
respect to the circumstances of Captain Smith’s lawsuit, we have also 
seen that there are serious drawbacks to junior military officers 
electing to sue their very own Commander-in-Chief. In light of those 
issues, how ought junior military officers in circumstances like Cap-
tain Smith’s proceed? 
 First, junior military officers can take comfort in the fact that as a 
prerequisite to entering the profession of arms, every superior officer 
above them has taken the same oath as they have: to support and 
defend the Constitution of the United States. Consequently, when a 
junior military officer questions the constitutionality of his orders, 
they can look first to see if anyone else in their own profession has 
the same doubts—if they do not, it may be an importantly telling sign 
that either (a) the order is well-founded, or (b) the decision to voice 
dissent does not conform with the common good.  
 Second, if junior military officers continue to harbor doubts about 
the constitutionality of their orders, we found that they have a ready 
and reliable resource available to them inside of their own profes-
sion—their very own JAG Corps. As a result, the junior military of-
ficer would do well to seek legal counsel within his own profession 
before going to the civilian sector for constitutional legal advice. Al-
most always, the matter should be put to rest here. If the JAG officer 
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finds the war is being waged illegally (or even on a shaky legal foot-
ing) he can raise those concerns up the chain-of-command. If he finds 
the order to be perfectly legal, the matter is over—at least for the 
junior military officer.  
 Third, we learned what a junior military officer ought not to do. 
For officers in Captain Smith’s circumstances, at least—don’t sue the 
Commander-in-Chief in federal court. Not only does the lawsuit po-
tentially hurt the social standing and legitimacy of the profession of 
arms, it hurts the legitimacy of the government military personnel 
are sworn to defend.  
 Finally, a lesson of caution: before adopting the legal arguments of 
an individual outside of the profession, junior military officers should 
consider the underlying motives for that legal interpretation. If they 
are clearly motivated by a domestic political agenda, there is no value 
in playing into to the partisan’s hands.  
VI.   CONCLUSION  
 The role of the Guardian of the Republic is complex and challeng-
ing, but there is none more important to society. This Note has 
sought to evaluate one Guardian’s actions, determining whether or 
not he had done the “right” thing by publicly questioning the legality 
of his orders. While we have determined that he did not, we have 
nonetheless learned a few helpful lessons along the way. To the ex-
tent our Guardians may debate or apply these lessons in the future, 
then, “[t]hat is likely enough.”144 
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